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Introduction 
As one of the poorest nations in the Western Hemisphere (with over 70 percent of 
the population living on less than $2 a day) (Grunewald et al. 2010), one wonders about 
the state of the Haitian Emergency Management System prior to the 2010 earthquake. 
Clearly, Haiti has been an economically-challenged nation for decades and its protracted 
poverty level further increases its vulnerability to disasters (PAHO 1994) and impacts its 
ability to respond and recover effectively when disasters occur. In addition, political 
instabilities have led to poor economic development opportunities and increased risks. In 
spite of Haiti’s economic and political challenges, it is possible to gain insight into what 
the country’s emergency management system looked like before the 2010 earthquake.  
Haiti had a fledgling national emergency management system in place - one that 
was heavily supported by both regional and international bodies. The earthquake of 
January 12, 2010, however, underscores the need for a better disaster reduction and 
response program, one that would address the underlying and protracted vulnerabilities of 
Haiti, while ushering in new winds of change that would pump fresh blood into the veins 
of the emergency management system.  
This chapter reviews the history of Haiti, including its demography and 
geography, and examines the hazards and factors contributing to the nation’s 
vulnerability to disasters. Furthermore, this chapter discusses some past disasters, Haiti’s 
emergency management system as well as the opportunities and the challenges 
confronting the system. We conclude by offering some recommendations for improving 
Haiti’s abilities to deal with disasters.  
 
Background 
The Republic of Haiti is located in the Caribbean where it shares the island of 
Hispaniola with the Dominican Republic. The terrain in Haiti consists of rugged 
mountains, flat coastal lands, and river valleys (The World Bank Group 2011). The 
lowest elevation in Haiti is the Caribbean Sea (0 m) and the highest elevation is the 
Chaine de la Selle (2,680 m) (CIA, 2012). Haiti is surrounded by the Dominican 
Republic to the east, North Atlantic Ocean to the north and the Caribbean Sea to the west 
                                                          
1
 Graduate Student, School of Public and Environmental Affairs, Indiana University Purdue University 
Indianapolis, 801 West Michigan Street, Indianapolis, IN 46202-5125.  
2
 Assistant Professor, School of Public and Environmental Affairs, Indiana University Purdue University 
Indianapolis, 801 West Michigan Street, BS 4070, Indianapolis, IN 46202-5125. 
3
 Assistant Professor, Public and Nonprofit Administration Department, Mitchell Hall 225 P.O. Box 413, 
Milwaukee, WI 53201. 
 
2 
 
and south.  Haiti covers an area of 27,750 square miles making it slightly smaller than the 
state of Maryland (Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 2012).  Haiti is known for its hot 
tropical climate and high humidity with daily temperatures ranging between 19
0
C
  – 280C 
(66.2
0
 F – F82.40 F) and 230C – 330C (73.40 F – 91.40 F) in winter and summer 
respectively (The World Bank Group 2011). More than half of the 9.8 million people live 
in urban areas with 2.1 million living in the capital city of Port-au-Prince (CIA 2012). 
Unfortunately, Haiti is located in the middle of a hurricane belt (CIA 2012) as well as on 
the Enriquillo-Plaintain Garden Fault between the Caribbean and North American 
tectonic plates (United States Geological Survey (USGS) 2010). 
Haiti is one of the poorest and most densely populated countries in the Western 
hemisphere with an unemployment rate of 40% and a per capita income of US $1,338 in 
2009 (Klose and Webersik 2010). Despite its small size and poor economic system 
(ranking 146 on UNDP Human Development Index), Haiti carries with it a rich and 
significant history characterized by struggle and triumph.  The country gained its 
independence from France after a slave rebellion in 1804 making Haiti one of the world’s 
oldest black republics (Telegraph 2010a).  Haitians speak mainly French and/or Creole 
and about 95% of the population is black, with 5% being mulatto and white.  Haitians are 
heavily dependent on the agricultural sector (2/3 of all Haitians work in this sector) 
meaning that natural disasters could have devastating consequences for the population 
when combined with the vast extent of deforestation (CIA 2012).   In addition, about 
30% of its GDP comes from overseas remittances (Klose and Webersik 2010). 
 
 
Fig.1. Map of Haiti showing its boundaries (source: US Dept. of State). 
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Hazards and Factors Contributing to Vulnerability in Haiti 
Hazards peculiar to Haiti include, but are not limited to, tropical storms, 
hurricanes, floods, deforestation, soil erosion, landslides, earthquakes, climate change, 
drought (CDEMA n.d.; Klose and Webersik 2010; The World Bank Group 2011; CIA 
2012). Haiti experiences tropical storms and hurricanes because it is located in a 
hurricane belt (CIA 2012).  As a result, tropical storms and hurricanes constantly pummel 
Haiti with storm surges and high winds (Brash 2012). For example, in 2008, four 
hurricanes - Ike, Fay, Hanna and Gustav - occurred within a 30 day period and caused 
serious damage to properties and killed over 1,000 people (Brash 2012). When tropical 
storms and hurricanes make landfall in Haiti, they dump a lot of water either through 
precipitation or in form of storm surges, which floods Haitian communities. In addition, 
Haiti experiences deforestation and consequently, soil erosion (Wdowinsky et al. 2010) 
and landslides (Pelling and Uitto 2001; Klose and Webersik 2010) because of the high 
demand for charcoal used for cooking (Barrett 2001, as cited in Ewers 2006).  Earthquake 
is also a big hazard because of Haiti’s propinquity to the Enriquillo-Plaintain Garden 
Fault (USGS 2010), which was responsible for the Haiti earthquake of 2010, which killed 
hundreds of thousands of people. Seismic activity that occurs in Haiti is typically at the 
intersection of the North American and Caribbean plates (USGS 2010). In addition, Haiti 
has two soil types - sandy and clay based soils - that are prone to earthquake damage 
(Kean 2010). Wet sandy soils shift unpredictably while clay soils shake violently during 
earthquakes (Kean 2010). With regard to climate change, Haiti ranks number one out of 
200 nations on the Climate Change Vulnerability Index created by Maplecroft, a risk 
management firm (Brash 2012). According to Brash (2012), Haiti’s ranking results from 
physical exposure (e.g. deforestation and location in a hurricane belt) and socioeconomic 
conditions (e.g., poverty level). It is quite ironic that despite the large amount of 
precipitation that hurricanes bring to Haiti, some parts of Haiti still suffer from drought. 
Drought, which is very common in the northwest because of the variability in rainfall 
patterns (e.g., annual precipitation varies from 500 mm in the lowlands to 1,200 mm in 
the mountains (The World Bank Group 2011)), typically leads to crop failure and loss of 
pasture (Raymond 2011). 
Haiti is at high risk for diseases, including but not limited to, AIDS, cholera, 
malaria, dengue fever and TB (Fraser et al. 2004; Hood 2010; Knox 2011; CIA 2012).  
Fraser et al. (2004) have identified a lack of infrastructure such as information and 
communication systems as a barrier to the treatment of an estimated 120,000 Haitians 
living with AIDS (CIA 2012). Although, cholera outbreak is not common in Haiti, the 
recent outbreak following the 2010 earthquake has renewed concerns about the deadly 
nature of cholera (Knox 2011). Although, this particular cholera outbreak was imported, 
poor sanitary conditions and a lack of immunity in Haiti have exacerbated the outbreak 
(Knox 2011). During raining seasons or floods induced by tropical storms or hurricanes, 
stagnant water and open containers used to store water can serve as breeding grounds for 
mosquitoes that cause malaria (Hood 2010). Malaria and other mosquito-borne diseases 
(e.g. dengue fever and TB) are prevalent in Haiti as a result of inadequate number of 
insecticidal nets, insalubrious conditions and overcrowding (Hood 2010). 
Haiti’s vulnerable is compounded by its poverty level and political and 
administrative instability (Klose and Webersik 2010; PAHO 1994). As noted above, 
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more than two-thirds of its citizens live on less than $2 a day (Klose and Webersik 2010). 
Another contributing factor to vulnerability is increased population in urban centers such 
as Port-au-Prince, Nord-Est, and Nord-Ouest (Klose and Webersik 2010). To make 
matters worse, some of these urban centers (e.g., Nord-Est, and Nord-Ouest) have the 
highest poverty rates and the lowest hospital densities (Klose and Webersik 2010). The 
implication of this is that if disasters occur in these areas, the critical assets needed for an 
effective response will be insufficient. On the issue of political instability, Diamond 
(2006) (cited in Klose and Webersik 2010, p. 10) notes that “all but one of 22 Haitian 
presidents from 1843 to 1915 were either assassinated or driven out of office.” As PAHO 
(1994, p. 101) noted, the adoption of nation-wide disaster reduction measures “requires 
political maturity and administrative stability;” as well as, support from “stable 
governments and continuity at high decision-making levels”. Other researchers (e.g., 
Pelling and Uitto 2001; Klose and Webersik 2010), have also identified deforestation as a 
contributing factor to vulnerability to hazards such as landslides. Finally, the absence of 
an effective national emergency management system in Haiti makes it a lot harder for the 
country to respond to disasters and be resilient to hazards.  
 
Past Disasters 
Haiti’s geographical location makes it most vulnerable to hurricanes, earthquakes, 
flooding, and occasional droughts (CIA 2012).  As demonstrated in the following list, 
Haiti never seems to get a break from disasters, both man-made and natural. In addition 
to the natural disasters mentioned above, Haitians have experienced man-made disasters 
such as civil wars, revolutions, invasions, piracy, poverty, and drug smuggling (Pressman 
2011).        
 A 7.4-7.5 magnitude earthquake struck near the east side of what is now the 
Dominican Republic on October 18, 1751.  About 75% of the masonry houses in 
Port-au-Prince were demolished (Klose and Webersik 2010).  A second 
earthquake (6.6 magnitude) occurred the following month near Port-au-Prince, 
destroying the city.  Additional earthquakes were felt for up to twenty days after 
(Bakun et al., 2012).   
 A 7.5 magnitude earthquake struck Port-au-Prince in 1770 killing 250 people and 
again destroying the city (Klose and Webersik 2010).  Bakun et al. (2012, p. 27) 
propose that the series of earthquakes from 1751-1770 may have “ruptured the 
entire Enriquillo fault system”.  
 An earthquake in 1842 destroyed Cap-Haïtian and several cities in Haiti 
(Telegraph, 2010b) killing 10,000 people (Klose and Webersik 2010).  Two years 
after this disaster, the Dominican Republic declared its independence from Haiti 
(Klose and Webersik 2010).  
 An 8.1 magnitude earthquake struck the Dominican Republic in 1946, but also 
severely impacted Haiti.  The earthquake and resulting tsunami killed 1,790 
people (Telegraph 2010c). 
 Civil Unrest. Between 1957-1971, it is estimated that between 20,000-50,000 
Haitians were murdered by the government under Francois Duvalier, also known 
as “Papa Doc.” Under his tyranny, thousands more Haitians fled the country.  
This leader instituted a secret police, known as the Tonton Macoutes, whose 
purpose was to “silence dissent” (Stevens 2005).  After his death in 1971, his son 
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Jean-Claude, also known as ‘Baby Doc’ came to power with the same corruption 
and tyranny demonstrated by his father.  Mass protests forced him into exile in 
1986 (Nelson 1998).  He recently reappeared out of exile in early 2011 (Padgett 
2011) where he was immediately charged with human rights violations, including 
murder, assassination, and torture, but the charges were dismissed in January 
2012 (Human Rights Watch 2012). Under the rule of “Baby Doc” Duvalier, 
hundreds of political prisoners were sent to one of three prisons, known as the 
“triangle of death,” where they experienced mistreatment including starvation. 
Independent newspapers and radio stations were closed down and journalists were 
beaten, tortured, jailed, or forced to leave Haiti (Human Rights Watch 2012).   
 Hurricane Flora, the 6th most deadly hurricane in history, killed over 8,000 people 
in Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Cuba in 1963 (Telegraph 2010c) causing 
$150 million in damages to Haiti (Poncelet 1997). 
 Hurricane Cleo killed 192 people in 1964, causing $17 million in damages to 
Haiti (InnovateHaiti.org 2006).  Cleo was a Category 4 storm with winds up to 
150 mph when it hit the southern peninsula of Haiti. 
 Hurricane Gordon killed over 1,000 people in 1994 (Telegraph 2010c); it turned 
from a tropical storm to a hurricane with 90 mph winds as it crossed into Cuba 
and Haiti (Smothers 1994).  The storm caused severe mudslides from the heavy 
rainfall (Pasch 1995) in areas with vast deforestation and serious flooding, 
landslides, and social disruption (Poncelet 1997). 
 The Tonton Macoutes (a volunteer private police force loyal to Francois Duvalier 
that kidnapped, killed and assaulted Haitians in the name of protecting Duvalier’s 
reign (The Columbian Encyclopedia 2008)) attacked a church service in Port-au-
Prince believed to include dissenters in 1988.  Nine people were killed and 77 
injured (Stevens 2005).  
 Jean-Bertrand Aristide, a Roman Catholic Priest, was the first democratically 
elected president of Haiti.  Prior to his inauguration, the former head of Tonton 
Macoutes attempted a coup d’etat which failed but resulted in a riot killing 125 
Haitians and causing $65 million in damages (Nelson 1998, p. 72).      
 Tropical Storm Jeanne, resulting in extensive flooding and landslides, killed over 
2,500 Haitians and left 200,000 homeless in 2004 (Telegraph 2010c).  The storm 
system stalled over the island of Hispaniola where many Haitians in Gonaives 
were killed by the resulting mudslides (Klotzbach and Gray 2005).  
 Four hurricanes—Fay, Gustav, Hanna, and Ike—occurred within 30 days of each 
other in 2008, killing over 800 Haitians (Pressman 2011) and causing more than 
$1 billion in damages (Kovacs, 2010).  About 60% of Haiti’s harvest was 
destroyed from Hurricanes Hanna and Ike (Pressman 2011).  The island of 
Gonave, and other areas, suffered extensive rain-induced flood damage (Brown et 
al. 2009).   
 A 7.0 magnitude earthquake hit about 15 miles south west of Port-au-Prince, the 
capital of Haiti (USGS 2010), at approximately 4:53 pm on January 12, 2010.  
Haiti, already ranked as one of the poorest countries in the world, suffered 
unimaginable losses (see Figures 2 and 3).  Final estimates report up to 316,000 
people killed and another 300,000 injured.  In addition, 1.3 million people were 
displaced (USGS 2010).  Overall damage estimates were $11.5 billion making it 
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the worst earthquake in the country’s history (US Dept. of State 2012).  The 2010 
earthquake directed the world’s attention to Haiti resulting in an outpour of 
support including 20,000 troops (see Figure 4), 20 ships, and 130 aircraft from the 
US alone (US Dept. of State 2012).   
 
 
 
Fig. 2. The Haiti earthquake of January 12, 2010 destroyed many homes (source: 
Authors). 
 As if the 2010 earthquake was not devastating enough, a cholera outbreak in 2010 
affected close to 300,000 people resulting in 4,500 deaths (Knox 2011).  It is 
believed the outbreak originated in a UN camp and spread to waters used for 
washing and drinking (Knox 2011).  The poorly managed sanitation systems in 
Haiti and the unorganized establishment of tent cities in the aftermath of the 2010 
earthquake (see Figure 5) exacerbated the spread of the cholera outbreak. Health 
care workers were unprepared to respond as the last cholera outbreak in Haiti was 
at least a half century earlier (Fraser 2010).   
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Fig. 3. The 2010 earthquake also destroyed Haiti’s National Cathedral (source: Authors). 
 
 
 
Fig. 4. The U.S. Army provided response support to the Haiti government after the 2010  
earthquake (source: Authors). 
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Fig. 5. Tent cities such as this one exacerbated cholera outbreaks after the 2010 Haiti 
earthquake due to poor sanitation (source: Authors). 
Haiti’s Regional History and Emergency Management System 
Due to the susceptibility of the Caribbean region to disasters, emergency 
management systems had to be put in place to reduce the impact of disasters on people, 
properties, and the environment. However, prior to the 1960s, emergency response in the 
region was characterized by ad hoc response arrangements (Pan America Health 
Organization (PAHO) 1994; Poncelet 1997). Nonetheless, “concerted regional disaster 
management initiatives… date back to the 1980s” (Poncelet 1997, p. 271) in response to 
a series of major disasters in several of the Caribbean countries. Exemplifying the 
growing consciousness of the significance of disasters on communities and their 
economies as well as the need for effective local response efforts, the international 
community
1
 assisted in the establishment of the first regional disaster preparedness 
initiative called the Pan-Caribbean Disaster Preparedness and Prevention Project 
(PCDPPP) (PAHO 1994; Poncelet 1997). For nine years, this project served all the 
nations in this region. Later on, Hurricane Gilbert in Jamaica (1988) and Hurricane Hugo 
in the eastern Caribbean (1989) compelled “the creation of a bona fide sub-regional 
response agency” (PAHO 1994) – the Caribbean Disaster Emergency Response Agency 
(CDERA) – now known as Caribbean Disaster Emergency Response Agency 
(CDEMA).
2
  CDERA commanded a much stronger position than PCDPPP – its 
predecessor – as this regional body entered into a number of “cooperative agreements 
with international agencies, including joint Caribbean air carriers and defense forces” 
(Poncelet 1997,  p. 272), which could be mobilized in the event of a disaster. As 
approved by the Caribbean Community Secretariat (CARICOM) in 1991, CDEMA is 
funded by its member states and donor agencies, and has the responsibility of mobilizing 
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resources among CARICOM countries.
3,4
 CDEMA, therefore, constitutes the Caribbean 
regional disaster response and management body
5,6
 and is a key resource for 
supplementing Haiti’s national emergency management system.  
The role played by CDEMA in the 2010 earthquake that devastated Haiti 
illustrates the important role CDEMA plays in supplementing Haiti’s emergency 
management system. After the earthquake struck, CDEMA, through CARICOM, was 
able to send in help within 24 hours (PAHO 2010) and deployed the CARICOM Disaster 
Relief Unit (CDRU)
7,8
 into Haiti. And, by January 18, 2010, the Jamaica Defense Force 
(JDF), leading the CDRU response, had already identified severely affected areas that 
had not received any humanitarian assistance. Overall, the CARICOM response effort 
consisted of 213 people from 11 regional countries, 184 military personnel, 25 medical 
personnel, and 4 technical support personnel.
9
 In addition to these teams, CDEMA also 
coordinated a Regional Response Mechanism (RRM) in support of the urgent needs for 
basic necessities like shelter and other relief supplies. Furthermore, CDEMA facilitated 
regional fund-raising efforts by setting up an account for channeling aid support.  
 
The Haitian National System for Risk and Disaster Management (SNGRD)  
As PAHO (1994) noted, any efforts in organizing and setting up national disaster 
mitigation and preparedness measures received very little, if any, support during political 
instabilities in Haiti in the 1990s. Nonetheless, legal provisions were made in the early 
1980s for disaster preparedness, including a focus on pre-disaster efforts (Government of 
Haiti (GoH) 2004). A key feature of the national disaster response efforts in Haiti and 
other places was the creation of Permanent Disaster Response Committees – small teams 
of 6 to 7 people tasked with briefing key players in disaster response. According to 
Poncelet (1997), such teams are more important in regions with limited national 
resources (including human personnel) for managing disasters as shown by the 
effectiveness and efficiency of this small structure in Haiti’s response to Hurricane 
Gordon in 1994.
10
  
Haiti’s SNGRD, prior to the 2010 earthquake, can be described as a network 
consisting of the Haitian government’s Department of Civic Protections (DPC), regional 
support (CDEMA) and various civic groups, both international and local. Driving the 
system was the DPC and the Permanent Secretariat for the Management of Risks and 
Disaster at the central, departmental, and communal levels. According to the Global 
Emergency Group,
11
 Haiti’s Civil Protection Agency or DPC – which is the equivalent of 
the U.S. FEMA – had the sole responsibility of Haiti’s domestic disaster response efforts. 
The SNGRD was placed under the Ministry of Interior and below this was the Permanent 
Secretariat of Risk Management and Disaster, who was tasked with the responsibility of 
coordinating and managing all of the SNGRD’s planned operations (GoH 2004). With 
the dual role of risk and disaster management, the Permanent Secretary also coordinated 
activities of 26 governmental and non-governmental organizations (NGO) engaged in 
natural disaster preparedness and response efforts in Haiti (Grunewald et al. 2010). 
Figure 6 below shows an approximate visual representation of what could be described as 
the structure of the Haitian SNGRD prior to the 2010 Earthquake.  
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Fig. 6. The Haitian National Risk and Disaster Management System prior to the 2010 
earthquake (source: Adapted from a presentation by a Haitian delegate at the High-Level 
Association of Caribbean States Conference on Disaster Reduction, November 14-16, 
2007
12
). 
While the Ministry of Interior was responsible for policy formulation in theory, 
DPC’s responsibilities entailed coordinating disaster preparedness and response 
operations at the national, provincial, and communal levels (GoH 2004; Grunewald et al. 
2010). Through DPC, SNGRD intended to decentralize the dual tasks of risk 
management and disaster preparedness and response to encompass efforts from the 
national government, local authorities, civil society groups, and the general public (GoH 
2004).  DPC therefore tasked with coordinating the implementation of both risk 
management and disaster management programs at both the central government and local 
levels in 1998
13
 (GoH 2004). The primary objective for this was to strengthen the 
nation’s capacity to respond to disasters effectively (GoH 2004).  Although the 
dynamism of the DPC was demonstrated in previous disasters (Grunewald et al. 2010), 
the agency was plagued with limited resources, which often undermined its ability to 
coordinate disaster-related efforts effectively (GoH 2004; Grunewald et al. 2010). In 
addition, the DPC tended to give priority to the most frequent emergencies, as opposed to 
the most serious ones (Grunewald et al. 2010, p. 22).  
Based on the development of regional capacity outlined in the preceding sections, 
we cannot overlook the efficacy and importance of regional support in response efforts. 
For example, the Haitian SNGRD capabilities were also heavily supported by 
contributions from the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) (UNDP 2012). 
However, this support has been overshadowed – and not in a good way – by the 
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overwhelming amount of international aid that has flowed into Haiti since 1970, either 
from bilateral agencies such as the United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID) or through International Nongovernmental Organizations (INGOs). In many 
respects, because of the nature of the aid such institutions provided to Haiti, INGOs in 
particular, could be considered as an integral part of the Haitian emergency management 
system. After all, there are almost 8,000 INGOs working in development and 
humanitarian assistance in Haiti, thus exuding a “near complete control… over Haiti’s 
development” and humanitarian assistance sector (Lawry 2010). Pointing to the over-
reliance on INGOs, especially one that is divorced from the control or accountability of 
the Haitian government, Lawry emphasized the fact that “there are more INGOs per 
capita in Haiti than any other country in the hemisphere.”  
 
Challenges and Opportunities facing Haiti’s Emergency Management System   
The natural and man-made disasters that continue to plague Haiti could be better 
mitigated against or even prevented by overcoming the following challenges: poverty, 
low levels of education, political instability, a lack of building codes, deforestation, and a 
lack of coordination among INGOs. First, despite receiving $1 billion in debt forgiveness 
through the Highly-Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) initiative in 2009, Haiti continues to 
not only languish in poverty, but also accrue further external debt (CIA 2012). And, as a 
result, implementing an effective emergency management system in Haiti is going to be a 
challenge. For example, poor Haitians are less able to prepare for disasters by storing 
away 3 days’ worth of nonperishable food, clean drinking water, and other supplies as 
recommended by FEMA.  As noted by PAHO (1994, p. 102), there is a need to stress the 
linkage “between socioeconomic development and disaster reduction.” 
Second, just over half of Haiti’s population aged 15 and older is considered 
literate (CIA 2012).  Without proper education, Haitians cannot gain employment and 
begin to contribute to the overall economy.  Further, emergency management education is 
important in establishing a culture of disaster preparedness (PAHO 1994), so that 
Haitians can develop a better understanding of how they can prepare for disasters and 
mitigate the impacts of hazards such as flooding and earthquakes. Currently, engineering 
curriculums in Haiti do not cover seismic design (Fierro and Perry 2010) and residents 
are oblivious of the risks they face from a wide range of hazards. Community awareness 
campaigns and school education programs on mitigation and preparedness strategies 
would be a good start.  
Third, political instability is another big challenge for Haiti. The first ruler of 
Haiti was a rebel leader who appointed himself emperor.  After his assassination, another 
rebel leader came to power (Nelson 1998).  This unorthodox and corrupt beginning to 
Haiti’s political system could ensue for years to come.  Most recently, Jean-Bertrand 
Aristide, the first freely elected leader, was forced out of Haiti in 2004 by a rebellion of 
gangs and former soldiers (Telegraph 2010a).  Political instability has contributed to the 
weak economic status of Haiti (Lundahl 1989) and Haiti’s ability to reduce disaster risks.  
Without stable governments, the political commitment to disaster mitigation and 
preparedness is bound to be weak and shaky. 
Fourth, Haiti neither has adequate building codes (Watkins 2010) nor are 
engineers, contractors, and architects required to have licenses (Fierro and Perry 2010).  
This problem often goes hand-in-hand with poverty as Haitians will attempt to build 
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whatever they can afford.  From personal observations during two visits to Haiti after the 
2010 earthquake, it was evident that some buildings were on slopes without strong 
foundations and insufficient steel.  Further, many homes are multi-story and built with 
“concrete blocks, woven wood mats, bricks or rocks…walls are typically heavy and are 
not reinforced” (Kovacs 2010, p. 4) while rural homes are built with bricks made with 
sand, clay and water mixed with sticks and straw (Kovacs 2010).  After the 1946 
earthquake, Haitians were encouraged to build homes with wood and stone rubblework; 
however, as time passed, wood became more expensive (Kovacs 2010). Most deaths 
from the 2010 earthquake resulted from collapsed buildings (Kovacs 2010).   
Fifth, Haiti is apt to experience deforestation to a greater extent because citizens 
want charcoal for cooking and farmers lack sufficient resources to maintain or improve 
existing farmland (McPeak and Barrett 2001, as cited in Ewers 2006).  Haiti’s annual 
deforestation rate was 3.4% between 1990-1995 (World Bank 1999, as cited in Pielke et 
al. 2003).  As of 2010, only 2% of forest cover remained (Telegraph 2010a). As a result, 
some experts (e.g., Wdowinsky et al. 2010) have speculated that deforestation was a 
contributing factor to the 2010 earthquake as it led to rapid erosion induced by frequent 
hurricanes.   
Finally, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) 
database listed 505 INGOs and 222 national NGOs currently operating in Haiti (OCHA 
2012), not counting the government agencies, military forces, and United Nations 
agencies also in Haiti. While the recovery and reconstruction phases in Haiti may usher 
in new winds of change through the myriads of INGOs and NGOs present in Haiti, a key 
challenge is a lack of coordination. The degree to which these organizations are 
effectively and efficiently coordinating with one another and especially with the Haitian 
government remains to be seen.  This lack of coordination can also result in waste and at 
times, abuse of resources due to an unnecessary duplication of efforts. Accountability 
channels would therefore need to be put in place between donors and recipients to ensure 
that funding gets to where it is supposed to.  
In spite of the aforementioned challenges, there are some opportunities that the 
Government of Haiti can leverage to improve its emergency management system. First, 
the Government of Haiti should use foreign aid, local and regional resources to bolster its 
emergency management system. One important strategy should be to strengthen the 
SNGRD and DPC’s capacity to coordinate response efforts as well as mobilize national 
and other local civic bodies to adopt mitigation and preparedness measures. For instance, 
the Haitian government should leverage the expertise and resources of civil societies such 
as nonprofits and NGOs in managing disasters. These organizations are viable sources of 
resources – given their unique position to raise funds through individual and institutional 
donations, especially when a government is fiscally challenged. Elsewhere, we have seen 
civil society institutions rise to the occasion as supplements, complements, and even 
substitutes to government provisions (Young 2000; 2006).  
Second, at the regional level, harnessing CDEMA as a regional resource could 
mean a timely and much faster disaster response system for Haiti. The advantage with 
CDEMA is that, it is already equipped with local and regional knowledge, and hence an 
unparalleled legitimacy that new INGOs do not possess. As noted by the Executive 
Director of CDEMA and perhaps demonstrated to some degree in CDEMA’s response to 
the 2010 Haiti earthquake, “the international community should only seek to engage 
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where there is demonstrated evidence that the country, its neighbors, and sub-region 
cannot support due to any type of resource deficit.” Their “enthusiasm… must be 
tempered by the recognition that countries do have capacities and… should support the 
implementation of nationally defined priorities and programming” (PAHO, 2010, p. 3). 
Since CDEMA’s members are located within the same region, response time is expected 
to be much shorter than waiting for say Canada to send in assistance. However, the 
timeliness and effectiveness of such regional response will largely depend on the extent 
to which CDEMA is resourced and has legitimacy within the region.   
 Third, the Haitian government should also harness foreign assistance – that has 
flowed into Haiti via a variety of vehicles, including the U.S. government (USG), INGOs, 
IGOs and other countries – to build national, local and regional capacities to manage 
disasters. For instance, by 2012, the USG had already committed over $1 billion towards 
relief aid, and pledged another $1.5 billion, of which the USAID’s contributions total 
over $500 million.
14
 Various organizations have responded to Haiti’s plight through 
funding and capacity building programs and projects. For instance, the USAID’s 
Emergency Capacity Assistance Program (ECAP) is designed to bolster Haiti’s 
emergency response systems. And, on January 5, 2012, the U.S. Department of Defense 
donated disaster-response equipment (e.g., SUVs, trucks, solar radios, and other 
equipment) to the Government of Haiti (Jura 2012) – equipment that is meant to help 
reinforce Haiti’s DCP capacity for disaster response. However, as the CDEMA’s 
Executive Director pointed out, “one must be mindful… that the global definition of a 
problem is not the same as the local articulation of the solution” (PAHO 2010, p. 3). 
Therefore, there is a need for the Haitian people to take over ownership of their own 
destiny – as they envision it – not as their benefactors deem necessary. 
Finally and sadly, the Haiti earthquake of 2010 presents the Haiti government 
with an opportunity to start afresh, especially in areas that were completely devastated, 
such as Port-au-Prince, Léogâne, and Gressier (Benjamin et al. 2011). The reconstruction 
of Haiti should be done with the goal of making communities less vulnerable and more 
resilient to future disasters. This will not be an easy task to say the least, because there 
may be obstacles such as a lack of political will, a lack of support from citizens, a lack of 
resources, and a lack of expertise needed to accomplish this lofty goal. Nevertheless, this 
earthquake is a focusing event (Birkland 1997) that has opened a window of opportunity 
to institute some disaster resilient initiatives, for Haiti and for the region. The focus 
should be on the importation of technology, capacity-building and emergency 
management skills and expertise (Benjamin et al. 2011). 
 
Conclusion 
With these points in mind, the authors offer some recommendation to help 
improve Haiti’s emergency management system. First, the increasing population 
densities in urban centers, especially in urban centers that are prone to hazards (Klose and 
Webersik 2010) should be met with a commensurate increase in mitigation strategies 
implemented, such as land use and zoning ordinances that can help to reduce the 
vulnerability of these urban centers. In addition, hazardous areas should be identified and 
relocation of residents out of these areas to safe parts of the country should be given 
serious consideration. Certainly, depopulating Port-au-Prince might be a good start. 
Furthermore, the establishment and enforcement of building codes for new and old 
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construction should be a priority (Poncelet 1997) in order to avert potential loss of lives 
and property destruction if another large earthquake occurs in the future.  
Second, forest regeneration programs are urgently needed in Haiti in order to 
reverse the pernicious trend of deforestation and environmental degradation. President 
Martelly’s vision of sustainable economic development (British Broadcasting 
Corporation 2012) is a step in the right direction. However, efforts should be made to 
ensure a comprehensive approach to sustainability by including both environmental and 
social spheres of sustainability. For example, tree planting programs would help to reduce 
landslides, serve as wind breaks for hurricane winds, and reduce flooding – this is a task 
that local and international NGOs could focus on.  
Third, implementation of poverty alleviation programs and educational programs 
in Haiti can help to reduce vulnerability to hazards. Steps must be taken not only to 
integrate risk reducing measures into national plans, but also to educate the public about 
the importance of risk reduction. Without adequate disaster education, Haitians would be 
oblivious of what constitute hazards and what type of avoidance strategies to adopt in 
order to reduce vulnerabilities.  
Fourth, the Haitian government will also need to strengthen the financial resource 
position and the level of emergency management expertise in DPC.  As Greenhalgh 
(2012) noted, “a strong Haitian Civil Protection Agency is needed, along with other civil 
society institutions,” in order to bolster the nation’s emergency response effort. Such an 
effort will include “reconstructing a well-functioning Civil Protection Agency 
headquarters” equipped with “a national emergency operations center” (Greenhalgh 
2012) where response activities to future emergencies can be coordinated.  
Fifth, the Haiti government should continue to collaborate with other Caribbean 
countries and strengthen the capacity of regional emergency management systems, such 
as CARICOM Disaster Relief Unit (CDRU) and CDEMA. These types of Inter-Island 
mutual assistance (Poncelet 1997) would allow Haiti to share response resources with its 
neighbors. The benefits of such regional partnerships cannot be overemphasized and 
should be taken more seriously by member nations, as well as respected by the 
international community.  
Finally, whether Haiti will be able to wean itself off of the aid dependency also 
remains to be seen. As we have seen in many African nations, INGOs can fail to produce 
sustainable results that culminate in the empowering of populations and governments to 
respond to and solve their own problems, especially when the aid providers are long gone 
(Easterly 2006). This is an area that both the Haitian government and INGOs would need 
to be mindful of especially during this time of rebuilding. In the future, the DPC will also 
need to regain operational capacity in anticipation of future natural disasters, a capacity 
that will rely less on what Lawry (2010) referred to as the “Republic of NGOs.” 
If these recommendations are implemented, the authors are confident that Haiti 
would reduce its vulnerabilities to hazards and become more resilient.  The politicians 
and citizens of Haiti have a responsibility to care for their own development and 
emergency management needs.  
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